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[Summarized below are excerpts from an interview with Guatemalan Defense Minister Hector
Gramajo published in the 09/04/88 edition of Prensa Libre (Guatemala). (From 10/05/88 report by
Regional Coordination for Economic and Social Research of Central America and the CaribbeanCRIES, Managua)] PL: Much has been said about the Army dictating the relationship between the
government and the guerrillas. Is this accurate? Gramajo: The major premise of the subversives is
to destroy the democracy that Guatemala experiences today. They are very dogmatic and have been
unable to register that since our entry into the democratic process, the military has been fulfilling
its constitutional mandate...and that we seek only to defend the Guatemalan state. The military
carries out military work, politicians must do the political the economists the economic, and so
forth. The politicians avoid relationships with the guerrillas because they do not seek suicide. The
Constitution... provides the norms of social and political coexistence in Guatemala. In refusing to
talk [with the rebels] because they are armed, the politicians are fulfilling the law. A small group of
anti-socials is not going to make the laws of this nation. We [the military] do not dictate anything.
We are simply fulfilling our role under the Constitution and this is what frightens people, because
they are not accustomed to a professional army which limits itself to carrying out its work and
refuses to go beyond the responsibilities assigned to it under the law. PL: Would the Army accept
participation of the guerrillas in a national dialogue? Gramajo: The Constitution says that legal
institutions have a right to participate in all decisions. [The guerrillas] are outside the law, and are
illegal. Thus, they have no right [to participate]. PL: How does your position fit with the guerrillas'
assurances [at a recent meeting] in Costa Rica that they wish to dialogue? Gramajo: That is only
a strategy...They speak of peace and dialogue, but at the same time assassinate policemen and
terrorize communities...If they really wanted to participate, they would disarm and enter orthodox
politics. PL: The guerrillas have insisted that it is you who do not wish to accept a truce. Gramajo:
That is a short-term strategy they have designed. We do not accept a truce proposed by...those who
seek to represent an armed band that struggles for its survival in the mountains. The combatants
are disconnected from a political elite who live in five-star hotels and who travel to Bonn, Paris
and Washington, to Mexico, to San Jose...The fighters in the mountains want nothing to do with
these political groups. On the day of the discussion in San Jose, we attacked one of their main
camps in southern Chimaltenango, and confirmed that their commander, Mr. Palma Lau, had
been abandoned by [the rebel political leaders]. Thus, we cannot accept a truce because those who
propose it do not have control over the combatants. PL: ...If there are no contacts between rebel
leaders and combat commanders, of what value are talks such as those in Costa Rica? Gramajo:
We have emphasized that this whole affair is nothing more than a temporary strategy. It goes
like this: in 1954 a large number of intellectuals and pseudo intellectuals went into exile. They
became university professors, editorial writers and critics of the government. In 1962, with university
students such as Andrade Diaz, Serrano Elias, Cerezo Arevalo, Salazar y Roca, the opposition to
the government was divided into two factions. One of them opted for clandestine struggle from
the mountains. Others, such as the students mentioned, opted for...conventional political struggle.
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Many of those who chose struggle in the mountains preferred to go to Mexico when they saw
how difficult confrontation with the Army turned out to be... PL: The Guatemalan Army does not
recognize a state of war. Is this true? Gramajo: There is no state of war as such. Problems emerge
because there are some armed bands who operate to survive. Every 20 or 22 days they attack ranches
or villages, rob 1,200 quetzals or so and hide their weapons. As you can see, there is no political
direction. became a political elite claim that they control these bands, but that is incorrect. On this
basis, they wish to see a fictitious state of war acknowledged. PL: What is, then, the real objective
of the insurgents' statements? Gramajo: When the government of President [Vinicio] Cerezo was
installed, [the insurgents] lost a great deal...Before Cerezo, they struggled against the Army because,
in their view, the Army "ran the government and oppressed the people." Now they have a major
problem because the people demonstrated their interest in democracy...At present, the guerrillas
find themselves opposing not only the Army, but the president and the will of the people. They
have no choice but to revise their strategies. Accordingly, they are prepared to take their case into
international forms, since that is the only place the guerrillas have an audience. In Guatemala, they
have been rejected by all sectors. PL: Is it true that the Army was irritated with the [peace] talks in
Madrid? Gramajo: There was no irritation...The joint chiefs, with reason, recommended a series
of...conservative measures. We had plans for the 1984-85 period, regarding the awareness of officers
on the meaning of democratic life, liberty and other concepts which had affected only certain
[military sectors]...Esquipulas and its accords accelerated what occurred in Guatemala. Meanwhile,
the Army and its officers supported a tremendous shakeup campaign of the ultraconservatives,
and the Congress...discussed who rules in the area of economic policy in Guatemala. Thus, when
the opportunity arose for sending representatives [to Madrid to meet with rebel leaders], we were
willing to send officers to observe in order to know the enemy, and to confirm that the guerrilla
representatives are cosmopolitans with fine hands and refined tastes who move well in European
capitals, and that they did not come from the mountains. [In Madrid], we confirmed that unity
between the political elite and the armed rebels does not exist. Moreover, we confirmed that their
vision and theses on Guatemala are 10 years outdated. They would prefer that we still lived in 1978.
PL: Can you speak to the Army's statistics on counterinsurgency operations? Gramajo: ...The most
tangible results are apparent for all to see. We succeeded in guaranteeing the harvest without a
single incident on the southern coast, where everyday life moves forward...and nothing has changed.
In the rest of the country, all is normal. PL: How are the results of these operations received by
the Army rank and file? Gramajo: They are received in a very positive manner, perhaps in part
because of [our] international isolation. As a result of the isolation, we have vastly improved
training and equipment maintenance: we can repair our boats, we have opened our own military
studies center...and consequently, we have increased our operational capacity. The guerrillas have
recognized this. Since Cerezo took power, we have developed the longest and most intensive
operations of the past 28 years. This has repercussions in officers' morale. PL: Groups on the
extreme right and some former officers say there are major tensions within the Army. What is your
reaction to these statements? Gramajo: Do you remember our interview of April 18? At that time I
told you something that I repeated later at a conference of the Chamber of Industry: the most [the
ultra- rightists] can hope to attain by investing large quantities of money was to create a minute and
insignificant fissure within the Army. The most they have succeeded in doing thus far has resulted
in the expulsion of 10 Army officers after the incidents of May 11. In response to these incidents,
we have taken corrective and preventive measures, mainly in terms of education and socialization
into the military profession...[At] this time we are better than before May 11. PL: Let's review...the
counterinsurgency strategy. Gramajo: Our analysis of the strategy we must follow derives from
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our conception of ourselves as a national army which struggles on its own territory against an
enemy. The fundamentals of our strategy are based on...defense of the fatherland and our fellow
citizens... A series of concepts have evolved from these fundamentals which have developed into a
successful strategy. [I]n late 1980, there was an influential subversive presence in eight departments;
95 villages in the northwest were under their control, of which 35 were capitals of muncipalities that
had been burned to the ground, such as occurred in Sacapulas, Nenton, Ixtahuacan, Chisec...The
influence of the subversives extended to nearly 300,000 Guatemalans, and they had 12,000 in
arms. Now, at the end of the decade, we ask how many villages and inhabitants they control. We
believe some 700 souls come and go from three obscure places, entering and leaving Guatemala
to hide. They wander about fantasizing, which includes their radio that in reality is heard only by
Military Intelligence who listen only to interfere with their transmissions...The poor things count 116
soldiers they have killed recently, for example. Do you believe that we wouldn't know if they caused
us such casualties? Perhaps the most important evidence of the success of our strategy is in the
number of times they have influenced government decisions since 1984. The last time they had any
influence was in 1983, when it was agreed to redistribute the armed forces throughout the national
territory. Since then, all decisions have been independent from [the guerrillas'] actions. PL: What
are your sources regarding the size of the insurgent forces? Gramajo: Documents we have captured
and reports from deserters. Desertion is...very high. A short time ago, a television news program
reported on a clash between the Army and a guerrilla column of 49 persons. When we talked to
[the guerrillas], we discovered that five had died, 15 were injured and 10 deserted. PL: To what do
you attribute this high rate of desertion? Gramajo: Basically, it is because we maintain constant
pressure....[I]n the countryside, [everyday productive] activity has not ceased. The price of fertilizers
has not increased, the cooperatives have been strengthened, several harvests have occurred, and
there is peace. When a guerrilla becomes aware of the possibility of working in peace and earning
a wage, it becomes very difficult to continue fighting under extremely disadvantageous conditions
and with much personal sacrifice. At present, everything is ending for them, as the governments
of friendly countries have stopped lending them support to destabilize a democratically elected
government such as the present one...

-- End --
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